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1.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case.

Plaintiff/Appellant Robert Gray ("Gray") sued the DefendantsIRespondents Tri-Way
Construction Services, Inc. ("Ti-i-Way") and Tri-Way's owners: Ray Allard ("Allard"), Gary
Peterson, and Kathy Peterson (collectively the "Tri-Way Parties") based on their failure to pay
Gray agreed upon compensation, 50% of the net profits for certain construction projects.'
In 2004, Gray entered into negotiations with the Tri-Way Parties regarding starting up
and running a division of Tri-Way in Arizona. Afier several months of negotiations, in late April
or early May of 2004, Gray, Allard, and Gary Peterson agreed upon the terms of Gray's
compensation.

As agreed by the parties, Gray had his attorney and accountant draft an

employment agreement that reflected, among other things, the previously agreed to
compensation for Gray. On May 19, 2004, Gray emailed the agreement to Tri-Way. On
May 21, 2004, Gray met Allard, Gary Peterson and Kathy Peterson to go over the terms of
Gray's employment and to sign necessary paperwork relating to his employment ("May 21
Meeting"). The employment agreement on hand at the May 21 Meeting reflected that Gray was
to receive a monthly salary of $4,000 through 2004, a monthly salary of $10,000 starting in
2005, and 50% of the net profits, before taxes for all projects that Gray managed.
At the May 21 Meeting, Kathy Peterson objected to Gray receiving $10,000 per month in
2005. In response, the parties agreed to a modification: Gray's monthly salary would escalate to
I

Gray's Complaint also alleged claims based on the Tri-Way PartiesJRespondents failure to abide by a certain
shareholder agreement. Gray is not appealing the dismissal of claims related to the shareholder agreement. Gray is
not appealing the District Court's attorneys' fees award.
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$8,000 (instead of $10,000) commencing on December I, 2004 (instead of the previously agreed
escalation date of January 2005). As for the payment of 50% of net profits, Kathy Peterson
stated that the net profits should be calculated on a calendar year basis. The parties agreed to this
method of calculation. The parties also agreed that the draft of the employment. agreement
would be revised by 'I'ri-Way's attorney to reflect the ~nodificationsand to add a non-compete
provision.
After starting up the Arizona Division of Tri-Way in June of 2004, Gray obtained and
managed two significant projects which promptly generated $1.2 million in revenue. In early
June of 2004, a written agreement that had been revised by Tri-Way's attorney was circulated.
The revised agreelnnents reflected compensation terms in accordance with the agreements reached
at the May 2 1 Meeting.
In September of 2004, three months into Gray's employment, Gary Peterson, acting on
behalf of Tri-Way, sought to modify the tenns of Gray's compensation relating to net profits.
Peterson's proposed modification called for Gray's share to be calculated after taxes and called
for a portion of Gray's share to stay with Tri-Way as retained earnings. After a period of
discussion and after an attempt by Gray to buy out the Petersons' share of Tri-Way, Gray left
Tri-Way in October of 2004. The parties never signed a written employment agreement.
Gray sued to recover the promised compensation.

The Tri-Way Parties asserted

counterclaims. The District Court granted the Tri-Way Parties motion for summary judgment.
Now Gray appeals the summary judgment ruling.
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B.

Course of Proceedings.

On Dccember 2, 2004, Gray filed a complaint and demand for jury trial against Tri-Way
alleging claims of breach of contract, statutory claim for wages, promissory estoppel, equitable
estoppel, and fraud. (CR 8).2 On July 13, 2005, Tri-Way filed its Answer. (CR 18). On
February 10, 2006, Gray filed his First Amended Complaint, adding Allard, Gary Peterson, and
Kathy Peterson as parties and adding claims. (CR 24). On March 13, 2006, the Tri-Way
PartiesIRespondents filed an Answer and Counterclaim. (CR 39).
On August 2, 2006, the Tri-Way Parties filed a motion for summary judgment against
Gray's claims. (CR 52). On August 2, 2006, Gray filed for summary judgment against the
Tri-Way Parties' counterclaims. (CR 55). The Tri-Way Parties did not oppose summary
judgment as to their claims for tortious interference, defamation, and quasi-estoppel. (CR
99-100).
On September 25, 2006, the District Court heard oral argument regarding summary
judgment. (CR 65): During the summary judgment hearing, the District Court, sua sponte,
ordered additional briefing regarding whether the statute of frauds barred Gray's claims. (CR
81). The District Court ordered the briefing despite the fact that the Tri-Way Parties had not
raised the statute of frauds in any pleadings and had not raised the issue at summary judgment.
(CR 81). By November 27, 2006, the parties completed their briefing regarding the statue of
frauds. (CR 69).

Clerk's Record on Appeal ("CR). An "Exhibit" is a document identified in the Cel.tificate of Exhibits at CR 179180. "Ex." refers to an exhibit attached to an "Exhibit" identified in the Certificate of Exhibits.
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On June 5, 2007, the District Court issued an order granting summary judgment for
Tri-Way ("June 5 Order"). (CR 81). On June 14, 2007, the District Court granted summary
judgment as to the Tri-Way Parties' counterclaims for tortions interference with prospective
advantage, defamation, and quasi-estoppel. (CR 99).
On July 3,2007, Gray moved for clarification of the June 5 Order, given the order failed
to discuss five of Gray's claims. (CR 201). On August 7, 2007, the District Court issued an
"Order clarifying June 5 Order and Correcting Order" ("August 7 Order"). (CR 105). The
August 7 Order was silent as to Gray's claims for constructive fraud and quasi-estoppel. (CR
105).
On September 12, 2007, the District Court granted an Order allowing the stipulated
dismissal of the Tri-Way Parties remaining counterclaims. (CR 122). On October 15, 2007,
Gray timely appealed from the Order of Judgment entered on September 12,2007. (CR 142; Cli
125). On December 21, 2007, the District Court entered an Order granting the Tri-Way Parties
recovery of costs and attorney fees. (CR 167). On January 18, 2008, Gray timely appealed the
award of attorney fees. (CR 175).
11.

A.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

At the Time of the Transaction, Gray was an Experienced and Highly
Compensated Construction Professional.

In 1983, Gray graduated from the University of Idaho with a degree in landscape
architecture. (CR 179, Exhibit 2, Ex. A (17:3-12)). After working for architectural firms in
California, Gray joined Albertsons in 1987. (Exhibit 2, Ex. A (17:15-18:5)). From 1987 until
his departure from Albertsons in 2004, Gray held positions of increasing responsibility within
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Albertsons' construction department. (Exhibit 2, Ex. A (20:3-40:13)). During his last five years
at Albertsons, Gray served as Regional Construction Director. (Exhibit 2, Ex. A (40:3-13;
43: 15-17)).

As Regional Construction Director, Gray supervised 10 to 12 construction

supervisors and their related support personnel, oversaw construction activities in Utah, Arizona,
Northern California, Oregon and Washington, and was accountable for a budget of "roughly
$200 million a year." (Exhibit 2, Ex. A (40:7-41:s)). As Regional Construction Director, Gray
earned a base salary of $108,000 plus stock options and annual bonus. (Exhibit 2. Ex. A (59:l60: 1)).
B.

Tri-Way Construction Services

Tri-Way is a Washington corporation providing construction services. (CR 26 17 11-14;

CR 400)). Tri-Way has offices in Auburn, Washington and Vancouver, Washington. Id At all
times reievant to this dispute, Tri-Way has been owned by Gary Peterson, Kathy Peterson, and
Ray Allard. (Id ).
While working at Albertsons, Gray interacted with Tri-Way ort several occasions.
(Exhibit 2, Ex. A (61-65)). Moreover, Gray had known Tri-Way's owner Aliard since the late
1980's. (Exhibit 2, Ex, A (62:3-14)). Gray and Allard had a longstanding friendship; they were
partners in the ownership of a race horse, played golf together, and socialized on a regular basis.
(Exhibit 2, Ex. A (62:15-64:s)).
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C.

The Parties Negotiated and Agreed Upon the Terms of Gray's Compensation
1.

In January and February of 2004, Gray and Tri-Way had Numerous
Discussions Regarding the Possibility of Gray Joining with Tri-Way.

In January of 2004, Gray began to consider leaving Albertsons. (Exhibit 2, Ex. A (61)).
During January of 2004, Gray and Allard had several discussions regarding Gray joining with
Tri-Way. In particular, they discussed the prospect of Gray starting up and running a division of
Tri-Way in Arizona. (Exhibit 2, Ex. A (68:l-21)).
By February of 2004, the discussions regarding Gray joining with Tri-Way had
progressed to the point that Gray, Allard and Gary Peterson decided to meet in person in the
Tri-Cities area in Washington. (Exhibit 2, Ex. A (68:l-21)). At the February meeting in the
Tri-Cities ("Tri-Cities Meeting"), Gray, Allard and Peterson discussed various arrangements by
which Gray would relocated to Arizona in order to start up and run a construction services entity
affiliated with Tri-Way. (Exhibit 2, Ex. A (70:23-71:6)).
At the Tri-Cities Meeting, Allard, Gary Peterson, and Gray determined that it would be
preferable to have Gray run a division of Tri-Way, rather than set up a new corporate entity.
(Exhibit 2, Ex. A (73:3-74:13)). Further, Gary Peterson suggested that Gray could eventually
purchase Peterson's ownership interest in Tri-Way. (Exhibit 2, Ex. A (73:3-74:13)). After the
Tri-Cities Meeting, discussions focused on Gray running a division of Tri-Way and buying out
Peterson's interest in Tri-Way. ( I d )
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2.

Gray's Discussions with Tri-Way Continued in March and April of
2004.

During discussions, including but not limited to discussions taking place in March 2004
and in April 2004, and in telephone conversations, Gray, Allard and Gary Peterson, discussed
and agreed to the terms of Gray's compensation. (Exhibit 2, Ex. A (76:4-15; 81:4-24; 93:796:16); Exhibit 4 (17 13, 14, 18)). Specifically, the three agreed that Gray would get paid $4,000
per month during the 2004, $10,000 per month during 2005, and would receive 50% of the net
profits, before taxes, generated by projects managed by Gray. (Exhibit 2, Ex. A (93:7-96:16;
179:19-180:6); Exhibit 4

(111 13, 14, 18)). With the terms of compensation set, Gray resigned

from Albertsons in early May of 2004. (Exhibit 2, Ex. A (93:7-13)).

3.

Tri-Way and Gray Reiterated Terms of Profit Sharing During the
May 21 Meeting.

Allard, Gary Peterson, Kathy Peterson, and Gray agreed to meet in Vancouver on May
21,2004. (Exhibit 2, Ex. A (108:6-17)). Prior to the May 21 Meeting, Gray forwarded copies of
a written agreement ("May Agreement"), prepared by his attorney, which reflected the
previously agreed upon terms of Gray's compensation. (Exhibit 2, Ex. A (Gray Depos. Ex. 6)).
The parties had taken the May Agreement to the May 21 Meeting. (Id.)
In relevant part, the May Agreement states:

Section 2.1. Position. Employee will be responsible for establishing an office or
division of the Employer to be located in the Phoenix, Arizona area. The Arizona
division or office, may also conduct business for the Employer in Nevada, Utah,
Arizona and New Mexico. For purposes of this Agreement, the Arizona division
shall also include all projects of the Employer which the Employee is managing.
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Section 4.1. Initial Base Salary. The Employee shall be paid a salary of Four
Thousand Dollars ($4,000.00) per month for the remainder of 2004. For 2005,
the Employee salary shall be the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) per
month.

Section 4.3. Incentive of Bonus Pay. The Employee shall receive an annual
bonus of fifty percent (50%) of the net profit, before taxes, of the Employer, such
net profit to be calculated only for the Arizona division of the Employer. The net
profit of the Arizona division of the Employer shall be calculated using standard,
normal and reasonable accounting and allocation factors commonly used in the
construction industry, as determined by the Employer in conjunction with its
independent accountant or certified public accountant. Bonus payments, if any,
shall be made at least annually, but may be made on a more frequent basis as
determined by the Employer.
(Exhibit 2, Ex. A (Gray Depos. Exhibit 6))
At the May 21 ' ~ e e t i nGray
~ , met with Allard, G&y Peterson, and Kathy Peterson. The
parties discussed adding a non-compete provision to a final written agreement. Gray indicated
that he did not object to a non-compete provision, but that Tri-Way should have its attorney draft
such a provision for Gray's review. (Exhibit 2, Ex. A (104:12-105:9)). Allard and Peterson
stated that Tri-Way's counsel would make the agreed upon changes to the employment
agreement. (Exhibit 2, Ex. B (213-214) ("The June 4 version of the agreement was prepared by
defendants' counsel."))
Allard, Gary Peterson, and Kathy Peterson represented to Gray that they had agreement
on all material terms, subject to the reduction of his post-December base salary to $8,000 per
month, regarding his employment with Tri-Way, including the terms of Gray's bonus.3 (Exhibit
3

'The parties had agreed that he would receive profit sharing compensation, based upon 50% of the Arizona net
profits. Gxhihit4, (111 12-13); (Exhibit 2, Ex. A (84:24-86:9)).

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 8

4, (77 11-15); Exhibit 7, (17 2-4); Exhibit 2, Ex. A, (84:15-85:25; 86:l-12,98:14-99:23; 100:25-

Gray "penciled in changes" onto the employment agreement at the May 21 Meeting.
(Exhibit 2, Ex. A (106:18-107:7)). The document with Gray's "penciled in changes" was then
forwarded to Tri-Way's attorney who then incorporated a non-compete into the agreement. That
was then forwarded on to Gray who signed the agreement. (Id.) As a result of the May 21
Meeting, Gray went to work for Tri-Way based on the compensation ternls of the agreement that
he had in his hands pursuant to the handwritten changes upon which the group had agreed.
(Exhibit 2, Ex. A (106:l-107:l)).

D.

The Terms of Gray's Compensation and Profit Sharing are Set Prior to His
Employment on June 1.

Allard and Peterson assured Gray that an agreement was in place. (Exhibit 4 (lj1112-14,
18)' They indicated that a revised version of the employment agreement would be signed. Id.

E.

In June, Gray Begins Worlung on Behalf of Tri-Way.

1.

Gray Brought in and Managed Two Projects for the Arizona Division.

During the first week in June of 2004, Gray went to Phoenix and began working as the
General Manager of the Arizona Division of Tri-Way. (Exhibit 2, Ex. A, (108:21-23; 246:1417); Exhibit 2, Ex. I3 (286:14-23, 289:19-24, 303:4-11)). Soon after joining Tri-Way, Gray
brought in and managed two significant projects to Tri-Way that resulted in significant revenue
for Tri-Way. (Exhibit 2, Ex. B (62:lO-63:7; 286:14-23)).
4

While disputing a specific agreement, Allard wid Peterson admit that they never told Gray that he would not
receive any profit sharing for his efforts on behalf of Tri-Way. (Exhibit 8, Ex. 6 (152:l-12). Peterson never told
Gray "anything like" Tri-Way is "never going to give you 50% of ihe profits." (Exhibit 2, Ex. B (213:7-12)).
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According to Gary Peterson, the gross revenues for Gray's projects were $960,000 and
$215,000.

(Exhibit 2, Ex. B (81:5-81:ll)).

Further, based upon Tri-Way's net income

statement, the Arizona division for Tri-Way generated $966,074 in net revenue and $271,792.48
in net profits from June 2004 to September 30, 2004. (Exhibit 8, Ex. F (Deposition Ex. 2 to
Kathy Peterson)).
2.

Tri-Way's Attorney Modified the Employment Agreement in
Accordance with the Agreement Reached During the May 21 Meeting.

As promised, in early June 2004, Tri-Way's attorney did revise twice, a written
agreement to reflect the additional terms that had been agreed upon at the May 21 Meeting. The
employment agreement, as revised by Tri-Way's attorney, was circulated to Gray shortly after
Gray began working at Tri-Way in early June. (Exhibit 2, Ex. B (213-214). The version of the
written agreement prepared by Tri-Way's attorney (Hoefel) incorporated the modification that
had been agreed upon at the May 21 meeting. (Exhibit 2, Ex. A (190:25-191:25; 120:25-

In relevant part the written agreement as revised by Tri-Way's attorney on June 4 and
June 10, 2004, made no modification to Section 2.1 and modified Sections 4.1 and 4.3 as
follows:

Section 4.1. Initial Base Salary. The Employee shall be paid a salary of Four
Thousand Dollars ($4,000.00) per month for the remainder of 2004. From
December 1, 2004, Through June 1, 2005, the Employee salary shall be the sum oj
Eight Thousand Dollars ($8,000.00) per month.
Section 4.3. Incentive or Bonus Pay. The Employee shall receive an annual
bonus of fifty percent (50%) of the net profit, pro-rated beginning June 1, 2004,
before taxes of the Employer, such net profit to be calculated only for the Arizona
division of the Employer, on a calendar year basis. The net profit of the Arizona
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division of the Employer shall be calculated using standard, normal and
reasonable accounting and allocation factors commonly used in the construction
industry, as determined by the Employer in conjul~ctionwith its independent
accountant or certified public accountant. Bonus payments, if any, shall be made
at least annually, but may be made on a more frequent basis as determined by the
Employer.
(Exhibit 2, Ex. A (Gray depos. Ex. 8, 9) (italics in original).

F.

In September of 2004, Tri-Way Indicates that It is Unwilling to Live Up to Its
Agreement Regarding Gray's Compensation.

In September 2004, three months into Gray's employment and after receiving significant
revenue from Gray's projects, Gary Peterson wanted to modify Gray's profit sharing
arrangement. (Exhibit 2, Ex. A (86:l-12; 124:12-126:24; 216:l-3, 216:15-217:18,229:9-231:l);
Exhibit 4 (7 16)).
However, when Gray put his understanding of Peterson's proposed modification in
writing, Peterson disclaimed Gray's understanding of the proposed modiiication. Gray came to
understand that Peterson was attempting to modify the terms in a way that was disadvantageous
to Gray and it became clear that Peterson would not live up to terms agreed to on May 21, 2004,
and memorialized in the June 4 draft from Tri-Way's c o ~ n s e l . ~
G.

Peterson Rejects the Buy Out Proposal and Gray Quits.

Late in Scptember 2004, Allard, Gray and Peterson met in person, in Auburn, to further
discuss Peterson's modification. (Exhibit 2, Ex. A (127:24-129:s)). After Peterson left the
meeting, Gray and Allard began discussions immediately buying out Peterson. (Exhibit 2, Ex. A
(129:22- 130:13)). The conversations between Allard and Gray culminated in early October
5

(Exhibit 4,77 11-13, 15)); Exhibit 2, Ex. A (126:7-128:7,216:24-217:18),
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when Allard and Gray made an offer to buy out Peterson. (Exhibit 2, Ex. A (129:24-131:14)).
Peterson countered Allard and Gray's buy out proposal with a demand for more money. (Exhibit
2, Ex. A, (13 1:7- 132: 12)). Neither Gray nor Allard could afford Peterson's terms, so Gray sent a
letter of resignation. (Exhibit 2, Ex. A (132:13-20; 259:22-260:4)).

H.

Gray's Efforts Significantly Enriched Tri-Way.

1.

The Arizona Division Generated significant Profits.

In 2003, Tri-Way did not make a profit. (Exhibit 2, Ex. B (54:12-15)) (loss of $42,000
for 2003). In 2004, Gray's projects were successful, profitable projects for ~ri-Way.(Exhibit 2,
Ex. B (221:19-24)). I n 2004, gross profits (revenues minus cost of goods sold) from the Arizona
Division were $336,000 (Exhibit 2, Ex. B (815-1 1; 83:9-12; 96:15-19)). (Gross revenues from
the Tooele Project were $960,000 and about $215,000 for the Juanita project.)
Peterson testified that, even after burdening the Arizona Division with a third of all
administrative costs and with owners' salaries, the Arizona Division achieved a net profit of
$178,000 in 2004. (Exhibit 2, Ex. B (97:6-99:2)). In contrast, the Auburn Division of Tri-Way
lost $50,000 and the Vancouver Division had a net profit of only $40,000. (Exhibit 2, Ex. B
(99:3-14)). Tri-Way admits that it would not have gotten the revenue if Gray had not joined TriWay. (Exhibit 2, Ex. B (220:lO-15)).
Tri-Way did not make any profit sharing payments to Gray. All of the profits were kept
by Tri-Way, Allard and Peterson. (Exhibit 2, Ex. B, (319:8-319:19) (recognizing that the profits
from the Albertsons work Gray brought to the company stayed in Tri-Way); Exhibit 4, (15)).
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2.

Value of Gray's Services.

Tri-Way concedes that it thought Gray would be entitled to some profit sharing
compensation for his efforts; the only factual dispute between the parties is the form of profit
sharing that Gray should receive. (Exhibit 2, Ex. B (1 I6:13-118:15); Exhibit 2, Ex. B (132:14133:15; 135:l-136:2) (stating that he "was never not in agreement for the 50 percent")) (Exhibit

2, Ex. B (135:l-136:2) (testifying that Tri-Way would have paid gray 50% of profits after tax if a
portion were kept in retained earnings).. As Gary Peterson testified:
Q. In June of 2004, did you, Gary Peterson, believe that Rob Gray was entitled t
receive bonuses equal to the net profit of the Phoenix division - 50 percent,
excuse me, of the net profits of the Phoenix division?

A. In what form?

Q. In payment.
A. In what form?

Q. In any form.
A. Yes.
(Exhibit 2, Ex. B 116:13-117:5) (Peterson just believed that Gray could not take out all of
the money in cash right away.)
Gary Peterson testified further as follows:
Q. Okay. Well, were you in agreement with Mr. Allard that you should pay him
50 percent?

MR. MURRAY: Objection.
THE WITNESS: I was never not in agreement for the 50 percent.
(Exhibit 2, Ex. B (134:4-15)).
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Gray was a Division Manager for Tri-Way. (Exhibit 2, Ex. B (82:4-6)). The only other
Division Managers were Allard and Peterson, each of whom received compensation of $120,000
per year. (Exhibit 2, Ex. B (184:18-20)). Tri-Way employees with fewer responsibilities who
lacked the ability to generate work were paid more than $4,000 per month. (Exhibit 2, Ex. C
(149:5-151:6); Exhibit 2, Ex. B (34:ll-3S:2l, 37:9-18; 37:24-38:lS; 51:17-521; 65:25-66:19)).
111.

A.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Did the District Court e n by failing to find an issue of fact as to whether the

Tri-Way Parties agreed to pay Gray 50% of net profits, before taxes, from the Arizona Division
of Tri-Way?

B.

Did the District Court err in ruling that the statute of frauds barred an oral

agreement to compensate Gray with a bonus within a year?
C.

Did the District Court e n in dismissing Grays statutory wage claim based on the

absences of any evidence of an agreement?

D.

Did the District Court err in dismissing Gray's equitable estoppel claim based on

the District Court's contention that there was no evidence of an agreement?
E.

Did the District Court err in dismissing Gray's implied-in-law contractlunjust

enrichment claim based on an incorrect finding that no evidence had been introduced as to the
value of gray's services and as to the amount Tri-Way was enriched? (CR 117)

F.

Did Gray establish issues of fact such that dismissal of Gray's constructive fraud

claim was improper?
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G.

Did the District Court err in dismissing Gray's fraud claim based on a lack of

evidence of justifiable reliance?

LV.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court's grant of summary judgment is subject to a de novo review. Carnell v.
Barker Mgmb., 137 Idaho 322, 326,48 P.3d 651, 655 (2002). When reviewing a district court's
grant of summary judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court uses the same standard a district court
uses when it rules on a summary judgment motion. Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 589, 21
P.3d 908, 91 1 (2001). Under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is granted
only when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). "All facts and inferences are to be
construed most favorably toward the party against whom judgment is sought...." Jordan, 135
Idaho at 590, 21 P.3d at 912. If reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw
conflicting inferences from the evidence, summary judgment must be denied, liarris v. Dep 't of
Health & Weyare, 123 Idaho 295,298,847 P.2d 1156, 1159 (1992).

V.
A.

ARGUMENT

Based On The Improper Finding That There Are No Pacts To Support A
Meeting of the Minds; The District Court Improperly Dismissed Pour Of
Gray's CLaims (Breach Of Contract, Statutory Wage Claim, Quantum
Meruit, And Equitable Estoppel)

Gray alleges that he had an agreement as to the terms of his compensation: (1) a base
salary of $4,000 per month until December of 2004 and then the monthly base salary would be
increased to $8,000, and (2) that he was to receive 50% net profits before taxes that he brought to
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the company which would be distributed at the end of the calendar term. At a meeting on May

21, these terms were agreed upon by the parties.
While Gray contemplated that the parties continue to work toward a comprehensive
written agreement which would include the terms of the compensation and other matters, the
terms of his compensation were not dependent upon a written agreement being finalized. To be
clear, Gray does not seek to enforce the coinprehensive written agreement that was never
finalized; he only seeks what was promised to him before he began work at Tri-Way and before
he brought $1.2 million dollars in revenue to Tri-Way.
The District Court conducted its entire analysis based on the fundamentally incorrect
assumption that Gray was trying to enforce a five year agreement that was never finalized. The
proper question is whether Gray introduced facts that there was an agreement as to the terms of
his compensation regardless of whether a comprehensive written employment agreement was
ever finalized. (See, e.g., CR 90-91).
1.

The District Court Was Required To Construe Facts in the Light
Most Favorable to Gray

The party opposing summary judgment is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable
inference that can be drawn from the evidentiary facts. G&& Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 1 19
Idaho 514, 808, P.2d 851 (1991). A11 controverted facts are liberally construed in favor of the
party opposing the summary judgment. Tusch Enterprises v. Coj?n, 113 Idaho 37, 740 P.2d 1022
(1987).

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 16

Whether a sufficient meeting of minds has occurred to form a contract is an issue of fact
to be decided by the jury. See Johnson v. Allied Stores Corp., 106 Idaho 363,368,679 P.2d 640,
645 (1984) (recognizing that "[wlhen the issue of a contract is in issue and the evidence is
conflicting or admits of more than one inference, it is for the jury to decide whether a contract in
fact exists," and that "[tlhe determination of the existence of a sufficient meeting of the minds to
form a contract is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of [acts") (internal citations
omitted). Further, the law does not impose a standard of absolute certainty relative to every
detail of a contract before the contract will be enforced. Instead, the standard for enforceability
is one of reasonable certainty.) General Auto Parts Co., Inc. v. Genuine Parts Co., 132 Idaho
849,979 P.2d 1207, 1215 (1999).
Here, the District Court failed to construe the evidence in the light most favorable to
Gray. In turn, the District Court wrongly established a number of facts adverse to Gray.
2.

Gray Introduced Evidence Indicating that Tri-Way Agreed to Pay
Gray 50% of Net Profits

Evidence indicates that Allard, Gary Peterson, and Kathy Peterson (I) represented to
Gray that he would receive 50% of the net profits from projects that he managed and (2) Gary
Peterson, Allard, and Kathy Peterson acted in a manner that indicated that they agreed that Gray
was to receive 50% of the net profits. (See, e.g., Ex. 4

(77

12, 13, 14, and 18); See also

Statement of Facts ("SOF") pp. 6-9.) In an Affidavit filed on August 3, 2006, Gray declared,
"[dluring discussions, including but not limited to discussions taking place in March of 2004, on
or about April 17, 2004, on or about June 9, 2004, and in subsequent phone conversations,
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Tri-Way, through Ray Allard, Kathy Peterson, and Gary Peterson, represented that I would
receive 50% of certain profits . . ." (Ex. 4 (7 18). Likewise, Gray repeatedly testified during his
deposition and in affidavits that representations were made to him that he would be paid 50% of
the net profits. (SOF pp. 6-10)

3.

The District Court Ignored Evidence, Failed to Construe Facts in
Gray's Favor, and Improperly Applied Caselaw

In considering whether Gray introduced evidence of an agreement, the District Court
only references two paragraphs of Gray's Affidavit dated 8130106 in its written ruling. (CR 83).
The District Court does not directly consider other evidence in the record, most especially Gray's
deposition testimony, that Allard, Gary Peterson, and Kathy Peterson affirmatively represented
to him that they agreed that he would receive 50% of net profits before taxes. The District Court
~rovidesno explanation as to why it fails to reference the other evidence in the record. (CR 8384, 108).

Further, the District Court improperly construed facts and made inferences in favor of the
Tri-Way Parties. (CR 86-87.) For example, Gray's October 26, 2004 email to Peterson should
not be construed as some kind of admission that there was never an agreement to pay Gray 50%
of the net profits. (Id,) Rather, when construed in a light favorable to Gray, the email reflects
that fact that Gray was not going to negotiate with Peterson as had been suggested by AllardGray's position was that the terms simply needed to be applied. (Exhibit 2, Ex. A (278:319))("Gary had the money in his pocket and negotiation wasn't going to help the situation.
Either Gary was going to be fair with me or he wasn't"); cf. (CR 111-2).
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The District Court relied on Inlermounlain Forest Management, Inc. v. Louisiana Paczjk
Carp., 136 Idaho 233, 31 P.3d 921 (2001) for the proposition that the agreements reached
between Gray and the Tri-Way Parties did not have a meeting of minds due to the fact that no
final written agreements were ever signed by the parties. (CR 91). The District Court in
Intermountain Forest Management concluded that based on the lack of the agent's actual
authority and the fact that the defendant indicated its intention not to be bound by the agreement
until signed, no contract had been formed. Notably, in Intermountain Forest illanagemerat there
was not any part performance.
Tlie Intermountain Forest Management case, however, does apply here.6 In this case,
there was performance. The evidence in the record supports Gray's claim that the parties did
intend to contract. Likewise, Gray had no reason to question whether Peterson and Allard had
the authority to contract with him on behalf of then~selvesand Tri-Way. Indeed, based upon his
understanding that enforceable agreements had been reached, Gray left Albertsons and joined
Tri-Way. (Exhibit 2, Ex. A (93:7-13); (Exhibit 4

(77

12, 14, 19)). Viewed in the light most

favorable to Gray, there is sufficient evidence that the parties intended to contract as to his
compensation terns prior to memorializing their agreement.

It is important to note that parties in Inteumounlain Forest Management had not requested a jury trial so the court
was allowed to "arrive at the most probable inferences based upon the undisputed evidence properly before it and
grant the summary judgment despite the possibility of conflicting inferences." Id., 136 ldaho at 235,3 1 P.3d at 923.
Here, the parties have requested a,jury trial to the Court must resolve conflicting inferences against the Tri-Way
Parties as the moving party. Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Products, 139 Idaho 172, 176, 76 P.3d 733, 737 (Idaho
2003) ("When a jury is to be the finder of fact, summary judgment is not proper if conflicting inferences could be
drawn form the record and reasonable people might reach different conclusions."). The fact that both parties have
moved for summary judgment does not diminish the Tri-Way Parties' burden. The court "must evaluate each
party's motion o nits own merits." tdaho Forest Management, 136 ldaho at 235, 31 P.3d at 923.
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Even if the parties expected that they might later memorialize their agreements in a
signed writing, there is ample evidence that Gray and Tri-Way intended to be bound by the
agreements they reached in May 2004. On May 21,2004, the parties discussed and agreed upon
the substantial terms of the agreement and then the Tri-Way Parties provided Gray with
employment paperwork, which Gray filled out. (Exhibit 2, Ex. C (123:17-23); (Exhibit 2, Ex. A
(108:6-15). Further, it is undisputed that, despite the lack of a signed agreement, Tri-Way
allowed Gray to quit his job with Albertsons, open an Arizona division for Tri-Way, develop a
client base, and generally undertake the agreed upon obligations. Also, each of the draft
agreements prepared after June 1, 2004, was written to apply retroactively to when Gray started
working on June I , 2004. (Exhibit 2, Ex. A (Gray Depos. Ex. 8,9)).
Additionally, there is no evidence that, even though they were aware that Gray believed
an employment agreement was in place, the Tri-Way Parties actually informed Gray that they
rejected the agreement or that the Tri-Way Parties provided Gray with any indication that he
should hold off on joining Tri-Way until the parties' agreement had been confirmed in writing.
Peterson testified that, at best, Gray "may have been" informed of any problems with or rejection
to the Agreement after his employment began. (Exhibit 2, Ex. B (199:14-200:lI) (Peterson
testified that he "probably" told Gray verbally sometime in June that he rejected the
Agreement)). Contrary to Peterson's ambiguous assertion, Gray testified in a sworn affidavit
that he never received any notice of the rejection or problems. (Exhibit 4, Ex. 12). In short, the
conduct of the parties reflects their intention to be bound by the agreement before it gets
memorialized.
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B.

The Statute of Frauds Does Not Bar Gray's Breach of Contract Claim

1.

The Agreement Regarding Compensation Can Be Completed Within
One Year

The District Court sua sponte applied the Statute of Frauds to Gray's claim. The statute
of Frauds does not bar Gray's claim.
I.C. § 9-505, the Statute of Frauds, provides, in relevant part, as follows:
In the following cases the agreement is invalid, unless the same or some note or
melnorandum thereof, be in writing and subscribed by the party charged, or by his
agent. Evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the
writing or secondary evidence of its contents:
1. An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the
making thereof.

By its express terms, I.C.

5

9-505 does not apply to contracts that can be completed

within a year from the making thereof. In this case, Gray is seeking to enforce an oral agreement
that the net profits would be paid to Gray on a calendar year basis, which given that Gray was
starting his employment in June would necessarily have meant that the net profits would have
been distributed within a year. Throughout the litigation and, on the record, Gray made clear
that he is not seeking cornpensation from Tri-Way for employment going forward; Gray is only
seeking to recover under the agreed upon bonus structure for the time that he worked at Tri-Way.
Accordingly, the contract claim before the Court is the agreement to share profit at the end of the
calendar year, an agreement that by its terms had to be completed within a year of Gray's hiring.

In Gomez v. Mastec, 2006 WL 3609 (D.ldaho 2006), an unpublished opinion,
Magistrate Boyle confronted a situation similar to the dispute at hand. While not binding on this
Court, the Gomez opinion is instructive. Gomez sued Mastec, a company involved in the
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construction of underground telecommunications networks, for breach of an oral employment
agreement. As alleged, the oral employment agreement called for Gomez to be employed for a
term of five years and was to be paid an annual salary of $120,000 plus expenses. Id. at

* 4.

Gomez alleged that the oral agreement provided for an "earn out bonus" equal to 7% of the
profits of the division in excess of 25% of the profit margin for the division. Id. at *4. Gomez
did work for Mastec for two years. Id. In 2002, Gomez was shown a financial statement that
showed that the division had earned revenues such that, under the employment agreement,
Gomez was entitled to a bonus of approximately $427,000. Id. Gomez was never paid the bonus
and was terminated. Id. Gomez filed a breach of contract claim against Mastec for failing to pay
five year's worth of salary and the earn-out bonus. Id. at *4. Defendant Mastec contended that
the employment agreement was barred by the statute of frauds.
The Court held that Gomez's claim to a five year employment contract was barred by the
statute of frauds since it was not in writing and did not come within the one year exception. Id.
at

* 7.

However, the Court held that Gomez's contract claim for a bonus for the time he worked

was not barred. Id at *8. The Court held that the breach of oral contract claim was not barred
by the statute of frauds for the reason "that it would be possible for the conditions of the earn-out
bonus to be completed within one year, on a year-to-year basis, during Gomez's actual time of
employment. Under these circumstances, the bollus agreement would not be required to be in
writing and the statute of frauds would not apply to the bonus during the actual years worlted."

Id. at 8.
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Likewise, Gray should be entitled to pursue his breach of contract claim for his share of
.the $1.2 million that he brought to Tri-Way. The conditions of Gray's profit share bonus were to
be completed within one year. In fact, in the case at hand, Gray's employment did end within a
year of his joining Tri-Way. Accordingly, Gray's agreement for a bonus need not be in writing.
To support its dismissal of Gray's claim, the District Court relied on the opinion in

Treasure Valley Gastroenterology Specialist v. Woods, 135 Idaho 485, 20 P.3d 21 (Ct.App
2001). However, the Treasure Valley case is inapplicable; there the plaintiff was trying to
enforce a provision which related to a number of years. Unlike the plaintiff in Treasure Valley,
in the case at hand, Gray simply brings a contract claim based upon the agreed upon
compensation terms as they relate to his employment of less than one year with Tri-Way.
2.

Equitable Estoppel Bars Application of the Statute of Frauds

Even if the statute of frauds did apply to the case at hand, Idaho Courts recognize that, in
cases in which there has been part performance, the doctrine of equitable estoppel may bar the
statute of frauds defense. Tew v. Manwaring, 94 Idaho 50, 53,480 P.2d 896, 899 (1971); Frantz
v. Parke, 111 Idaho 1005, 1007-8, 729 P.2d 1068, 1070-1 (Ct. App 1986). For equitable
estoppel to apply the performance must be explainable solely by the contract at issue. Id.
In the case at hand, there has been part performance by both Gray and Tri-Way. Here the
contract at issue is the agreement for Gray's employment. Pursuant to Gray's employment
agreement, he relocated to Phoenix, brought $1.2 million in net revenue to Tri-Way, and took
actions to establish Tri-Way's Phoenix division.

Tri-Way performed pursuant Gray's

employment contract. Tri-Way paid Gray's relocation expenses. Tri-Way paid Gray the agreed
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upon base salary. Tri-Way calculated the profits for the Phoenix division separately. Tri-Way
even tried to pay Gray a bonus (albeit one that was substantially less than what he was entitled to
under the agreement). Also, the Tri-Way Parties admit that Gray was to gel an increase in his
base pay after one year. (The admission of an increase in base pay is in line with the terms of the
agreement urged by Gray.) Here, all of the parties' acts of performance are solely explainable by
Gray's employment agreement. The parties simply disagree as to how Gray was to be
compensated. Accordingly, there has been part performance by the parties and, in turn, the
Tri-Way Parties are equitably estopped from asserting the statute of frauds.

C.

The District Court Erred In Dismissing Gray's Statutory Wage Claims.

The District Court dismissed Gray's statutory wage claim based 011 the finding that "Gray
introduces no evidence that the parties ever actually agreed to the terms of his bonus." (CR 9697). As discussed previously, Gray did introduce evidence that the parties agree to the terms of
his bonus compensation. The District Court simply failed to construe facts in favor of Gray.
According Gray's wage claim should not have been dismissed.

D.

Gray Introduces Evidence Related to the Value of His Services; Gray's
Quantum Meruit Claim Should Not Have Been Dismissed
1.

Any Evidence Tending to Show the Value of Services Is Sufficient

The doctrine of quantum meruit is a remedy for an implied in fact contract and permits a
party to recover the reasonable value of services rendered or materials provided on the basis of
an implied promise to pay. Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Wareham, LLC, 141 Idaho 185, 191, 108
P.3d 332, 338 (2005). "An implied in fact contract is defined as one where the terms and
existence of the contract are manifested by the conduct of the parties with the request of one
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party and the performance by the other often being inferred from the circumstances attending the
performance." Fox v. Mountain West Elec., Inc., 137 Idaho 703, 708, 52 P.3d 848, 853 (2002)
(quoting Farnwortk

IJ.

Femling, 125 Idaho 283,287,869 P.2d 1378, 1382 (1994)).

Such a contract is grounded in the parties' agreement and tacit understanding. Id., 95
Idaho at 743,518 P.2d at 1205. Hausam v. Schnabl, 126 Idaho 569, 574, 887 P.2d 1976, 1081
(Ct. App. 1994). "The general rule is that where the conduct of the parties allows the dual
inferences that one performed at the other's request and that thc requesting party promised
payment, then the court may find a contract implied in fact." Homes by Bell-Hi, Inc. v. Wood,
110 Idaho 319, 321, 715 P.2d 989, 991 (1986) (citing Clements v. Jungert, 90 Idaho 143, 153,
408 P.2d 8 10, 8 15 (1965); Bastian v. Gafford, 98 Idaho 324, 325, 563 P.2d 48,49 (1977)).
For a quantum meruit claim, the measure of recovery is the reasonable value of the
services rendered or of goods received, regardless of whether the defendant was enriched.

Ericlison v. Flynn, 138 Idaho 434-435, 64 P.3d 959, 963-964 (Ct. App. 2002); Barrji, 140 Idaho
827, 103 P.3d 440 (Idaho 2004). This is an objective measure and is proven by evidence
demonstrating the nature of the work and the customary rate of pay for such work in the
community at the time the work was performed. Baker v. Boren, 129 Idaho 885, 894, 934 P.2d
951,960 (Ct. App. 1997); Peavey v. Pellandini, 97 Idaho at 659, 55 1 P.2d at 610 (1 976).
The District Court held that Gray's quantum meruit claim should be dismissed as there
was "no evidence that the customary rate of pay for his work in the community at the time the
work was performed included such a bonus."

(CR 115).

The District Court failed to

acknowledge evidence in the record and read the applicable~ruletoo narrowly.
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In Idaho, absent an agreement fixing compensation, any evidence tending to show the
reasonable value of services is generally admissible. See Peavey v. Pellandini, 97 Idaho 655,
551 P.2d 610, 616 (1976) (finding evidence of costs is relevant); 66 Am.Jur.2d, Restitution and
Implied Contracts, 5 89 at 1031 (1973)).

2.

Gray Introduced Evidence Indicating the Value of His Services

Evidence of the value of Gray's services can be found with reference to the benefit
achieved by Tri-Way. Were, Tri-Way obtained hundreds of thousands of dollars in net profits in
a few months owing to Gray's efforts. Evidence as to a parties enrichment is sufficient to create
an issue of fact as to the value of Gray's services.
Also, the parties actions create factual issues as to the value of Gray's services. For
example, Tri-Way testified that it always intended to share profits with Gray. The only dispute
was regarding the formula to be used. Moreover, Tri-Way went so far as to offer (and then not
pay) a $60,000 bonus to Gray. (Exhibit 2, Ex. B (237:20-238:3)). The $60,000 was, according
to Gary Peterson, Tri-Way's effort to "make a fair assessment of the value and offered [Gray]
that as a bonus for the two project he ran." (Id.)
Finally, there is evidence in the record that Gray previously earned more than $100,000
plus bonus and benefits in his previous position. Also, the record indicates that employees filing
lesser functions within Tri-Way received significantly more than $4,000 per month.
In short, "[tlhe majority rule in quantum memit recovery is that absent an agreement
fixing compensation, any evidence tending to show the reasonable value of services is generally
admissible." Fairbanks North Star Borough v. Tundra Tours, 719 P.2d 1020, 1029 (Alaska
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1986) (citing Peavey v. Pellandini, 97 Idaho 655, 551 P.2d 610, 616 (1976) and 77 Am Jur. 2d,
Restitution and Implied Contracts, 5 89 at 1031 (1973)).

E.

Gray Introduced Evidence of the Amount That Tri-Way Was Enriched;
Gray's Unjust Enrichment Claim Should Not Have Been Dismissed

Unjust enrichment, or restitution, is the measure of recovery under a contract implied in
iaw. Barry v. Pacific West Coast., inc., 140 Idaho 827, 834, 103 P.3d 440,447 (Idaho 2004)
(citing Peavy v. Pellandini, 97 Idaho 655, 658, 551 P.2d 610,613 (1976)). A contract implied in
law, or quasi-contract, "is not a contract at all, but an obligation imposed by law for the purpose
of bringing about justice and equity without reference to the intent of the agreement of the
parties, and, in some cases, in spite of an agreement between the parties." Erickson v. Flynn, 138
Idaho 430,434-35,64 P.3d 959,963-64 (Ct.App. 2002
Herc, the District Court dismissed the unjust enrichment claim, holding "Gray introduced
no evidence of the amount Tri-Way was enriched by bringing in two projects." (CR 117)
The District Court encd. Gary clearly introduced evidence that Tri-Way was enriched.
As indicated, it is undisputed that Gray brought two very profitable projects (with respective
gross revenues of at least $960,000 and $215,000) to Tri-Way that by far outweighed the $4,000
per month salary he was paid by Tri-Way. (Exhibit 4 Ex. (

14); (Exhibit 2, Ex. B (81:5-11)).

The District Court failed to recognize the undisputed evidence that Gray's efforts had
significantly enriched Tri-Way ($966,070 in revenue and $271,792.48 in net profit from June
through September 30, 2004 for one project alone) and, as such, equity demands that Gray be
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entitled to a share in the value of those services. (Exhibit 8, Ex. F (Deposition Exhibit 2 to

K. Peterson Dep.)).
F.

Gray Introduced Evidence Sufficient To Support His Constructive Fraud
Claim

The District Court did not expressly address Gray's claim for constructive fraud. (CR
102-122).
"An action in constructive fraud exists when there has been a breach of a duty arising
from a relationship of trust and confidence, as in a fiduciary duty." Hines v. Hines, 129 Idaho
847, 853, 934 P.2d 20, 26 (Idaho 1997) (reversing District Court's denial of motion to amend to
include constructive fraud claim, citing McGhee v. McGhee, 82 Idaho 367, 371, 353 P.2d 760,
762 (1960).

"In its generic sense constructive fraud comprises all acts, omissions and

concealments involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust or confidence and resulting in
damage to another. Constructive fraud usually arises from a breach of duty where a relation of
trust and confidence exists; such relationship may be said to exist whenever trust or confidence is
reposed by one person in the integrity and fidelity of another." McGhee, 82 Idaho at 371, 353
P.2d at 762.
Gray had a longstanding friendship with Allard. Moreover, the arrangement at issue was
one of profit sharing. Further, Gray began working at Tri-Way based upon representations that
any subsequent written agreement would accord with the verbal agreements reached at the May
21 Meeting. Once the parties reached an agreement in May 2004 regarding the terms of Gray's
employment, Gray placed Tri-Way in a position of trust, believing that they would carry out their
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obligations under those agreements and not take steps directly contrary to his interests. Given
the nature of the relationship between the parties and the fact of Gray's trust in the Tri-Way
Parties to protect his interests, a relationship of trust and confidence is appropriate in this case.
Summary judgment should have been denied.
1.

Gray Presented Evidence Sufficient To Create An Issue of Pact
Regarding Justifiable Reliance.

Gray's claim for fraud is based on affirmative misstatements of facts as well as fraudulent
concealment with the intent to induce Gray to begin his employment with Tri-Way. Both are
supported by facts in the record and provide a basis for denial of the Tri-Way Parties' motion for
summary.
As set forth above, the Tri-Way Parties' attempts to construe the parties' agreement as
one that was still in negotiation are not supported in the facts. Moreover, Gray did not, as the
Tri-Way Parties contend, acknowledge that the terms "were never agreed upon by the parties."
To the contrary, Gray testified that he reached an agreement on the material terms of both the
employment agreement and the option to purchase the Petersons' interest in Tri-Way at the May
21, 2004 Meeting. To the extent that the Tri-Way Parties made representations of fact regarding

Gray's salary andlor profit sharing compensation without disclosing to Gray that they had no
intention of honoring that agreement, the Tri-Way Parties have acted fraudulently. Similarly, to
the extent the Tri-Way Parties fraudulently concealed their intention not to honor the agreement
according to the terms that they had reached with Gray in order to induce him to begin working
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for Tri-Way, they have acted fraudulently. Both sets of facts are supported by the record in this
case.
The District Court held that there was not any justifiable reliance as gray could not have
reasonably relied on any representation that he would be paid 50% of net profits.
Here, Gray has introduced facts that support a claim for equitable estoppel on the basis
that the Tri-Way Parties falsely represented or concealed material facts from Gray regarding
their intention to honor the terms of the parties' agrecinent regarding salary and profit sharing
compensation. Gray had no way of knowing that the Tri-Way Parties had no intention of
honoring their agreement with Gray until after Gray had already left Albertsons and started work
at Tri-Way. Additionally, as indicated, the Tri-Way Parties made the representations affirming
the compensation terms and concealed their true intentions with the intent that Gray rely on
them. Gray did in fact rely on those representations and was damaged. Consequently, given the
disputed and undisputed facts in the record, summary judgment on this claim is inappropriate.
The evidence also supports the reasonableness of Gray's reliance on the Tri-Way Parties
promises and his impression that the parties had reached a bargain on the terms of his
employment, including the amount of his profit sharing compensation. One important such fact
is that the Tri-Way Parties never told Gray that they had rejected the terms of his employment
agreement. Also of importance is the fact that the Tri-Way Parties allowed Gray to begin
working and only later attempted to renegotiate the terms of Gray's agreement with Tri-Way.
(See, e.g., Exhibit 4 (7 16)).
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VI.

Request for Attorneys Fees

PlaintiffIAppellant Gray requests attorneys fees pursuant to Idaho Code

8 12-120(3) and

§ 12-121. The gravamen of this dispute is a commercial transaction.

VII.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Gray requests that this Court reverse the District Court's grant of
summary judgment for the Tri-Way Parties. Substantial issues of fact exist which compel
allowing this dispute to proceed to trial.
DATED this 21st day of May, 2008.
HOLLAND & HART LLP

Attorneys for ~ l ' a i n t i f f l ~ ~ ~ e Robert
l l a n t Gray
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 21st day of May 2008,I caused to be served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

b
#&

Jason G. Murray, Esq.
MOFFATT
THOMAS
BARRETT
ROCK
&FIELDS,CHTD.
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
P.O. Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701-0829
Fax: (208) 385-5384

"

for ~IOLLAND&
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Hand Delivered
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Telecopy (Fax)

